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Statement of Jurisdiction
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § § 78-2a-3 (2) (d) (appeals
from circuit courts) and 78-2a-3(2) (f) (appeals from a court
of

record

in

non-felony

criminal

cases).

Judgment

of

Conviction was entered against the defendant/appellant David
N. Lynch ("Mr. Lynch)11 for disorderly conduct (an infraction)
on April 26, 1994 by Judge Joseph I Dimick of the Fourth
Circuit Court, Utah County.

Mr. Lynch's Notice of Appeal was

filed within 3 0 days later on May 20, 1994.
Issues on Appeal and Standard of Review
1.

Whether Defendant, by his failure to raise the

issue of the propriety of the trial court's actions in taking
note of the evidence previously presented, failed to preserve
his claim that the trial court committed error.
Standard of Review:

This is an issue of law and this

Court need accord no deference to the ruling of the trial
court, but should review it for correctness.

State v. Pena.

869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
2.

Whether a trial

court

judge, who has been

present and presided over at a jury trial, commits reversible
error when he takes notice of the facts presented at that
trial when the matter is subsequently tried to the court
1

without jury, where the court provides an opportunity to both
sides to present additional evidence beyond that presented in
the jury trial.
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law and this
Court need accord no deference to the ruling of the trial
court, but should review it for correctness.

State v. Pena,

869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
3.

Whether the evidence in this case is sufficient

to support the conviction.
Standard of Review:
fact.

This is primarily an issue of

Findings of Fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous

standard.

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).

Determinative Statutes. Ordinances, and Rules
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(a)

Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial

notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.

2

(c) When discretionary.

A court may take judicial

notice, whether requested or not.
(d)

When mandatory*

A court shall take judicial

notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information.
(e)

Opportunity to be heard.

A party is entitled

upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
matter noticed.

In the absence of prior notification, the

request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f)

Time of taking notice.

Judicial notice may be

taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g)

Instructing

jury.

In

a

civil

action

or

proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed.

IN a criminal case,

the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
76-9-102.
(1)

Disorderly Conduct.
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(a) He refuses to comply with the lawful order

of the police to move from a public place, or knowingly
creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any
act which serves no legitimate purpose; or

3

(b)

Intending to cause public inconvenience,

annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof:
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent,
tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or
(ii)

He makes unreasonable noises in a

(iii)

He makes unreasonable noises in a

public place; or

private place which can be heard in a public place; or
(iv)

He engages in abusive or obscene

language or makes obscene gestures in a public place; or
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian
traffic.
(2)

"Public

place,"

for

the

purpose

of

this

section, means any place to which the public or a substantial
group of the public has access and includes but is not limited
to

streets, highways,

hospitals,

apartment

and

the

houses,

common

office

areas

of

buildings,

schools,
transport

facilities, and shops.
(3)

Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if

the offense continues after a request by a person to desist.
Otherwise it is an infraction.

4

Statement of the Case
1.

As a result of an altercation between himself,

his sons and two American Fork City police officers, Appellant
David Lynch was charged with violating American Fork City
Ordinance § 76-8-305, Interference With a Peace Officer, a
class B misdemeanor.
2.

(Addendum 1, Brief of Appellant).

On February 17-18, 1994, a jury trial was held

on this charge

in the Fourth Circuit Court before the

Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, which trial resulted in a hung
jury and a mistrial.

(Addendum "A", Appellee's Brief).

3. Subsequently the City amended its information to
charge Appellant with a violation of American Fork City
Ordinance § 76-9-102, Disorderly Conduct, an infraction.
(Addendum 2, Appellant's Brief).
4.

At a hearing on March 23, 1994, the court

indicated that at the trial set for April 25 it would be
taking notice of the evidence received at the prior trial. He
then asked if there was any reason he should not proceed in
that fashion. Counsel for Defendant indicated that he thought
that was the correct procedure.
Brief).

5

(Addendum "B11, Appellee's

5.
Circuit

Trial on this charge was held in the Fourth

Court

before

Judge

Dimick

on

April

25,

1994.

(Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief).
6.

At trial, Judge Dimick took judicial notice of

the evidence presented at the prior proceeding and afforded
counsel for both parties an opportunity to present further
evidence.

(Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pgs. 2-3).
7.

No objection was made by defense counsel to this

procedure by Judge Dimick.

(Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg.

3).
8.

Judge Dimick found Appellant guilty as charged

and fined him $50.

(Addendum "C", Appellee's Brief).

9. Subsequently, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal
and made several claims of error.
Statement of Facts
An accurate statement of the facts is difficult if
not impossible to set forth because the Defendant has failed
to procure a transcript of the original trial proceeding in
this matter.

However, from the court's statements at the

trial on April 25, 1994, it is possible to determine the facts
that the Judge was taking notice of and used in making his
decision:

6

1. THE COURT: Yeah. The City's testi—the City's
account of it was that they were having to deal with Mr.
Lynch7s presence much longer than any simple exchange of "not
now, later". (Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg. 7 Ins. 8-11).
2.

THE COURT: They say it went on and on at high

volume. (Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg. 7 Ins. 13-14).
3.

THE COURT:

Do I take note of what you want me

to make note of?
MR. MUSSELMAN:

I think so, your Honor.

Beyond

that, I think it's a matter of argument as to the weight or
the meaning of that evidence as far as this—the theory of the
charge now. (Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg. 8 Ins. 9-14).
4.

THE COURT:

In terms of unreasonable noises in

a public place, I think they propose that directly.

I don't

have any difficulty construing the meaning of that language so
that an ongoing, full-voiced, half shouted argument with
police and conducting an investigation in this busy place is
capable of carrying that burden of proof for the City.

I

should imagine it would be one of the principal types of
applications for that language, very easy conclusion for me.
(Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief pg. 15 Ins. 14-21).
5.

THE COURT: With respect to that, most of what

the defense presented denied continuing, denied the volume
7

too. All parts of what the City presented had to do with them
having to deal with that and repeated requests to withdraw, to
retire, to quit, to let them do what they needed to do were
ignored, while the point was made several times.
I think the City's carried its burden of proof, Mr.
Lynch.

I return a verdict of guilty as charged. (Addendum 3,

Appellant's Brief, pg. 17 Ins. 17-24).
Summary of Argument
If a defendant fails to raise an issue at trial, he
is prevented from raising it on appeal. Defendant, by failing
to raise the issue at trial, has failed to preserve his claim
that the trial court committed error in taking notice of the
facts presented at the previous trial. The only exception to
this rule is where there has been "plain error." A finding of
plain error requires that the error be obvious and harmful.
In this case, where the judge, after indicating in
a prior hearing that he would be taking notice of the facts
presented at trial, took notice of those facts at the trial
and then gave the Defendant a full opportunity to present
evidence, there was no obvious and harmful error. The harm of
any alleged error was obviated by the judge then allowing the
Defendant to present evidence.

8

The Defendant, knowing full

well what the judge was proposing, then chose not to present
any evidence.
Even

if this

Court

reaches the

issue

of the

propriety of the trial court taking notice of the previous
testimony, the trial court's ruling should stand.

Rule

201(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, allows a court to take
judicial notice of a fact that is "capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." The trial court took notice of the
facts that had been presented at trial.

These facts were

capable of accurate and ready determination by reference to
the tape recording of the original proceeding.

The parties

did not dispute what facts were presented at the original
trial.

The dispute was over the weight to be given to the

different facts presented at trial.
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict him; however, the Defendant has failed to
marshall the evidence supporting the conviction.

This court

cannot adequately entertain Defendant's arguments in light of
Defendant failing to meet his burden in this regard. However,
even from the record presented, it is clear that there was
sufficient evidence to find Defendant guilty of the infraction
of disorderly conduct. The court specifically found that the
9

Plaintiff

met

its

burden

Defendant, despite repeated

of

proof

by

showing

that

requests by officers

the

for the

Defendant to withdraw from the area while they pursued a
detention and investigation, made unreasonable noises in a
public place by willfully carrying on an ongoing, full-voiced,
half-shouted argument with the police.
Argument
I.

The Defendant Failed to Preserve for Appeal the Issue of
the Trial Court Taking Notice of the Previous Testimony
The Defendant claims that the trial court committed

reversible error when it took notice of the facts presented at
the previous trial.

However, the Defendant's

failure to

preserve this issue at trial precludes consideration of the
issue on appeal.
It is well established that appellate court will not
consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised
for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed
plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances.
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993); accord
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 853-854 (Utah 1992).

Therefore,

to ensure the trial court's opportunity to consider an issue,
appellate review of criminal cases in Utah requires that some
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made
10

a part of the trial court record before an appellate court
will review such claim on appeal. State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d
607, 611 (Utah App. 1993); (quoting State v. Johnson , 774
P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989)); accord State v. Tillman, 750
P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987).
It is undisputed that the defendant failed to raise
any

objection

at trial

regarding

the trial

court

taking

judicial notice of the facts presented at the previous jury
trial.

In fact, counsel for the Defendant joined with the

court in a cursory review of the testimony presented at trial.
By

failing

to

object

at

trial

to

the

court's

actions,

Defendant is precluded from raising this issue for the first
time on appeal.
As noted in the case law set forth above, the only
exception

to

the

rule

requiring

the

Defendant

to

raise

objections at the trial court level is where there is "plain
error or the case involves exceptional circumstances."
v. Brown. 856 P.2d at 359.

State

A finding by the court of plain

error requires that the error be obvious and harmful. State v.
Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); accord State v. Eldredqe,
773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989).

It is difficult to see how any such

error was obvious, particularly in light of the language of
Rule 201(b) (2), Utah Rules of Evidence, which is discussed in
11

detail below.

Also, based on the Defendant's attorney's own

statements, any alleged error was not obvious. When the trial
court indicated on the hearing on the 23 rd that he would take
notice of the prior proceedings, attorney for the Defendant
indicated that he thought that was the correct procedure.
(Addendum

"B",

Appellee's

Brief

pg.

5

Ins.

6-17).

Additionally, it is difficult to see how the court's
actions were harmful.

The trial court judge observed the

entire jury trial. He witnessed the demeanor of the witnesses
as they testified. The defendant was given advance notice, at
the hearing on March 23rd, that the court would be taking
notice of the facts presented.

The following is an excerpt

from that hearing:
THE COURT: Well, what I'd propose to do is to
set a hearing that will have multiple purposes; the
first is arraignment that the defendant has
requested; the second is trial.
And I intend to take judicial notice of the
evidence received at the prior trial, which was
tried in my presence, to allow you further
opportunity to present evidence if you wish it. I
would encourage not being duplicative of the prior
trial.
Any reason we shouldn't proceed in that
fashion?
MR MUSSELMAN:
I think that's the correct
procedure.
(Transcript of Further Proceedings, March 23, 1994, Addendum
"B" Appellee's Brief at 5, Ins. 6-17) (Arraignment was on the
amended charge of disorderly conduct).
12

After taking notice of facts that had been presented
at trial, the court then gave each party the opportunity to
present evidence•

When presented with the opportunity to

present evidence, counsel for Defendant simply said, "We're
prepared to argue it, your Honor." (Transcript of review
hearing, April 25, 1994, Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief at 3,
Ins. 5 & 6).
The Defendant has failed to show what harm there was
to the defendant by the court's actions.

In order for this

court to address whether the trial court's actions were
harmful, the Defendant should have provided the court with a
transcript of the proceedings in the original jury trial.
Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have
the duty and responsibility to support their allegations with
an

adequate

record.

"xAbsent

that

record

Defendant's

assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which
the review court has no power to determine.'"State v. Barella,
714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986)(quoting State v. Wulffenstein,
657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982) , cert, denied. 460 U.S. 1044 (1983) ) .
If the court would have had the parties recall their
witnesses,

it

is presumed

that the witnesses

initially

testified to what they believed was the truth and that there
testimony would be similar in nature to their original
13

testimony.

There is no claim that any of the evidence would

have changed.

That being the case, it does not appear that

there was any harm in the court proceeding as it did.
Since any alleged error was not obvious and harmful,
there was no plain error.
involve

"exceptional

exception

to

And, since this case does not

circumstances", which

preserving

an

objection

on

is the
appeal,

other
the

Defendant's failure to raise the issue at the trial court
level precludes the issue from being considered on appeal.
II.

The Trial Court Properly took Notice of the Facts
Presented at the Prior Trial
The Defendant argues that the rules of evidence

prevent the court from taking notice of the facts presented at
the prior trial.

The adoption of the current Rules of

Evidence fundamentally weakens appellant's judicial notice
argument. The previous Rules of Evidence, Rules 9-12, and the
Utah Code, Section 78-25-1, had listed a variety of situations
in which judicial notice was permitted.

Many of these rules

were themselves codified from previous common law developments
cited by appellant.

The adoption of the current Rule 201,

however, superseded these rules and "consolidate[d] the law of
judicial notice . . . into one broadly defined rule." UTAH R.
EVID. 2 01 adv. cmtee. note.

The resolution of this issue
14

therefore turns on a construction of the language of the
current rule and not on prior case law relying on superseded
statutes.

See Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, (Utah Ct. App.

1989) (recognizing that the rule allowing "judicial notice of
the records and prior proceedings in the same case" relied on
a superseded statute, while also citing to a case which
assumed the propriety of taking judicial notice of a previous
action).
Rule 201(b)(2) states that "[a] judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it
is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
The trial court complied with this Rule because:

(1) it took

judicial notice of the fact of the evidence presented in the
previous trial and not of the facts which this evidence was
presented to prove; (2) this fact was "capable of accurate and
ready determination" by resort to the tape recordings of the
proceedings, which could have been listened to by the judge,
or reduced to transcript form and read by the judge; (3) the
tape recording of the trial is a "source whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned"; (4) the facts noticed are therefore
"not subject to reasonable dispute" within the meaning of this
rule; and (5) both plaintiff and defendant had "opportunity to
15

be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed."
First, the trial court took notice not of the facts
at issue but of the fact of the evidence presented in the
previous

trial.

The

transcript

reflects

the

following

conversation:
THE COURT: How do you want to proceed?
MR HANSEN: It's my understanding that you're
going to take judicial notice of everything that
has occurred in the trial; that being the case, the
City has no further evidence to present and would
rest.
THE COURT: Mr. Musselman?
MR MUSSELMAN:
We're prepared to argue it,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, let's just make sure that I
know what I'm taking judicial notice of. That's the
way I prefer to proceed.
The evidence began with . . .

THE COURT: Is there any other portion of the
presentation of your case you wish me to take
notice of?
MR HANSEN: No, I think that's about it.
THE COURT: How about the defense?
MR MUSSELMAN: I think that's essentially it.
If
I
remember
Officer
Falslev's
testimony
correctly, . . .

THE COURT: Do I take note of what you want me
to make note of?
MR MUSSELMAN: I think so, Your Honor. Beyond
that, I think it's a matter of argument as to the
weight or the meaning of that evidence as far as
this—the theory of the charge now.
16

(Transcript of Review Hearing of April 25, 1994, Addendum 3,
Appellant's Brief at 2 In. 24 to 3 In. 10; id. at 6 In 22 to
7 In. 2; 8 Ins. 9-14.)

The trial court was quite clearly

taking notice of the fact that the evidence had been presented
and not of the facts in dispute.

Rather, the court decided

the disputed facts on the basis of the evidence of which
judicial notice had been taken.

Contrary to appellant's

assertion, the fact judicially noticed—the prior testimony—
was not "hotly disputed" but was concluded by both sides after
each had summarized and discussed it in open court.

The

dispute over "the weight or the meaning of that evidence" does
not create a dispute over its prior admission into evidence.
Second, the fact that the testimony was offered was
"capable of accurate and ready determination" by resort to the
tape recording of the prior trial.
actually

consult

the

recording

The parties' failure to
or

have

it

transcript form does not offend this provision.

reduced

to

Appellant's

arguments in this regard are somewhat disingenuous. Appellant
speaks of a transcription as something "required by Rule
201(b)(2)," but this requirement appears neither in the text
of the rule nor in the cases cited. He cites Riche v. Riche,
784 P. 2d 4 65 (Utah App. 1989) in support of this argument.
However, Riche interpreted Rule of Evidence 201(d) which deals
17

with

mandatory

judicial

notice,

and

the

fulfilling

of

requirements which make a court's taking judicial notice of
facts mandatory, such as the requesting party supplying a
transcript to the trial court.

Id. at 468.

In the instant

case, the trial court used its discretion to take judicial
notice of the prior proceedings as allowed by Utah Rule of
Evidence

201(c).

The lack of a transcript

available is therefore, not error.

immediately

Also, a transcript could

have been produced, if counsel for both parties and the court
deemed it necessary to determine the accuracy of what was
noticed.

However, neither party nor the court was troubled

with the accuracy of what was judicially noticed and neither
counsel objected to the trial court's action.

Therefore,

because there was no reasonable dispute as to the facts
judicially noticed, and the accuracy of those facts could have
been determined by sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
questioned, Rule 2 01 was satisfied and the trial court did not
err. The Defendant also cites Matthews, but Matthews holds in
relevant part that a judge cannot take judicial notice of a
fact for which no adequate transcript exists.

Matthews v.

State, 839 P. 2d 1215 (Idaho 1992) . In Matthews, the court was
concerned that the trial judge had taken judicial notice of a
fact from a case nine years old, for which an incomplete
18

transcript was available (one day of thirteen) . Id. The court
was also concerned that even a complete transcript would not
have supported the fact noticed:

adequacy of counsel. Id.

Unlike Matthews, an adequate transcript was available in this
case which the parties and the judge could have consulted to
determine any dispute, and the transcript would have revealed
the type of information sought—the facts were therefore
capable of accurate and ready determination.

In short,

neither Rule 201 (b) (2) nor the cited case law supports
appellant's apparent demand that the transcript actually be
placed before the trial court.
Third,

a trial

transcript

is a

"source whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."

As mentioned

above, Utah courts have regularly taken judicial notice of
judicial transcripts. Fourth, the facts noticed are therefore
"not subject to reasonable dispute" within the meaning of this
rule.

The phrasing of this rule suggests that no reasonable

dispute exists where the facts noticed
accurate and ready determination

..."

are "capable of
In any case,

appellant does not challenge the accuracy of the fact of the
testimony of which the trial judge took notice. Finally, both
plaintiff and defendant had "opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
19

matter noticed." The excerpts of the transcript quoted above
illustrate the trial judge7s efforts to ensure that each side
agreed both to the propriety of the action and to "the tenor
of the [testimony] noticed." Appellant had adequate notice of
the court's intent to take judicial notice from the March 23,
1994 hearing, as indicated in the following dialogue:
THE COURT: Well, what I'd propose to do is to
set a hearing that will have multiple purposes; the
first is arraignment that the defendant has
requested; the second is trial.
And I intend to take judicial notice of the
evidence received at the prior trial, which was
tried in my presence, to allow you further
opportunity to present evidence if you wish it. I
would encourage not being duplicative of the prior
trial.
Any reason we shouldn't proceed in that
fashion?
MR MUSSELMAN:
I think that's the correct
procedure.
(Transcript of Further Proceedings, March 23, 1994, Addendum
"B", Appellee's Brief at 5, Ins. 6-17.)
In short, Rule 201 now allows a court to take
judicial notice of previous proceedings in other actions.
This court has exercised this power on at least one occasion,
see State v. Ewell. 883 P.2d 1360 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (taking
judicial notice of transcript from another trial), and has
discussed appellate judicial notice under the assumption that
notice could be taken of previous actions, see Mel Trimble
Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. , 758 P.2d 451 (Utah Ct.
20

App. 1988) (discussing at length the issue of taking judicial
notice of the record from a previous action on an appeal from
a subsequent action); see also id. at 455 (discussing, in the
context of collateral estoppel, the burden "to produce the
record of the prior proceeding [and] urge the court to take
judicial notice of it").

As illustrated by this analysis and

these examples, the prior common law and statutory lists of
matters proper for judicial notice have been supplanted by the
general rule established in Rule 201.

The facts noticed in

this case meet every requirement of this Rule.
III.

The Evidence is Sufficient to Support a Conviction
A.

Defendant has Failed to Marshall the Evidence
The Defendant's final argument is that the evidence

is insufficient to support a conviction.

In challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence, the Defendant has a heavy burden.
He must marshall all evidence supporting the jury's verdict
and must then show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient
to support the verdict even when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict. State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 472
(Utah App. 1991) (erupting State v. Purdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1207
(Utah App. 1991)); accord Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745
P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987).
burden.

He

completely

Defendant fails to meet this

fails
21

to

marshall

the

evidence

supporting the judge's verdict and, consequently, fails to
show how it is insufficient to support the verdict.
As has been discussed previously in this brief,
parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have
the duty and responsibility to support their allegations with
an

adequate

record.

Ifx

Absent

that

record

Defendants

assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which
the review court has no power to determine.'"State v. Barella.
714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986)(quoting State v. Wulffenstein.
657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982) , cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983) ) .
In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, this court can
only assume the regularity of the proceedings below. Jolivet
v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)

Cert, denied

493 U.S. 1033 (1990); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah
1986).
The Defendant has failed to provide the court with
an adequate transcript of the proceedings below and has failed
to marshall the evidence presented to the trial court.

As

such, the defendant has failed to carry his burden on appeal
and the conviction of Defendant of disorderly conduct should
stand.

22

B.

The Evidence Supports the Conviction
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

on two grounds.

First, appellant states that since the only

evidence offered was that judicially noticed, and since this
evidence was improperly noticed, there is no evidence at all
to support the charge.

Since the evidence was properly

noticed as discussed above, this claim fails.
Second, appellant argues that even the evidence
judicially noticed was insufficient to support the conviction
because it did not show intent. There was sufficient evidence
in the record, however, to show that appellant's conduct
exhibited the prohibited mental state. The trial court based
the conviction on American Fork's enactment of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-9-102(1)(b) (ii), which states in relevant part that
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if . . .
Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance,
or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof . .
. He makes unreasonable noises in a public place.
The trial court took notice that the officers had testified
that they dealt wit Mr. Lynch "much longer than any simple
exchange of 'not now, later," and that "it went on and on at
high volume."

(Transcript of Review Hearing of April 25,

1994, Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief at 7 Ins. 8-14; see also
id. at 5:17-22.)

23

This evidence is adequate to show intent. The trial
court could believe from this evidence that Mr. Lynch had a
"conscious objective or desire to cause public inconvenience."
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(1) . Even if Mr. Lynch were not
intending to cause public inconvenience, he also "recklessly
creat[ed] a risk" of "public inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm."

Mr. Lynch was reckless as to creating this risk

because (1) by repeatedly asking him to withdraw, (see Hearing
Transcript, Addendum 3, Appellant's Brief at 17 Ins. 18-22),
the officers made him aware of the risk, (2) because the same
requests

indicate

that

the

risk

was

substantial

and

unjustifiable, (3) because his repeated confrontation after
requests to withdraw indicate that he consciously disregarded
that risk, and

(4) because persisting loudly to confront

police officers after the requests to withdraw is "of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all of the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint."

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-103(3)

(defining reckless conduct as that occurring "when he is aware
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
24

disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.11)

The

officers7 testimony on these points was sufficient to allow
the judge to find that intent had been established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
For these reasons, American Fork City requests that
the trial court7s decision be affirmed.
DATED this 9 7 ^ 1A day of March, 1995.

25
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Addendum Index
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B. March 23, 1994 Hearing Transcript of further
proceedings in Trial Court (Original of Transcript filed in
Court of Appeals as part of the record on appeal.)
C.

Judgment, sentence of Trial Court.
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

The Court's record will reflect that

4

the jury has returned, I think without a verdict; that

5

Counsel and Mr. Lynch is present.

6

Who of you is acting as foreperson?

7

MR. PORTER:

8

THE COURT:

9
10

I was, your Honor.
Is it so, Mr. Porter, that you haven't

been able to reach a verdict?
MR. PORTER:

That's correct.

11
12

that there are at least some of you who tnin/i tnat further

13

rime would nor be profitable.

14

MR. PORTER:

15

THS COURT: - Let me ask you thaz individually.

16

MR. PORTER:"* The jury was evenly divided and--

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. PORTER:

19
20
21
22
23

Yes.

We--

Okay.
--all parties definite that they

couldn't change their mind.
THE COURT:

That—have a chair for just one moment

and let me ask that individually.
LaRae Croft, are you of the opinion that more time
would not help this jury reach a verdict?

24

MS. CROFT:

I am.

25

THE COURT:

Marlin Green, are you of the opinion

2

t h a t more .time would n o t help t h i s j u r y reach a v e r d i c t ?

1
2

MR. GREEN:

Yes.

3

THE COURT:

New, I assume, Mr. P o r t e r , t h a t ' s s o ,

4

for ycu?

5

MR. PORTER:

Yes,

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. 5EEGMILLER: Yes.

8

THE COURT:

And Mr. Seegmiller?

Okay.

Let me make a remark or two

about that to you so you don't leave here 'fi u. uli

9

U1J.ACU

1

That's a fair thing for a jury to do.

10

feel m g s abcUi.: it.

11

You ought to take your best shot at coming to an agreement,

12

but as the instructions told you and I hea iT— argued ^ui*^

l

ie the case for

f

13

j

rV NZ

14

1

J

A

J.

-self and that's one possible outcome.

ss U*i-

that. ycu have

15

f ?•• ^ S f 3

4

r-

12 —• v

That doesn't mean

v- C* C! *} .i. -•"^ **

If that's where you are in your *

16
17

the=„ that's where you are and that doesn't mean the system

18

did not work.

19

arrive at after taking your best shot at i c, none of those

20

poss ible verdicts is a failure, that's a f<air outcome for

21

it, please don't leave us feeling frustrat ed in and of

22

itse If because that happened, because that 's a fair thing

23

for a jury to do.
And in casual conversations out there, I think I

24

25

That's one of the--any verd.let that you

1

«? ^^ asked how I would have decided .it, and I don't think I

3

1

was a b l e to a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n .

2

to t h i n k

That c o n c l u d e s

it.

of these p a r t i e s want to talk to y o u about how

you

If any

5

saw t h e c a s e or h o w

6

to a n s w e r

7

okay, t h a t ' s e n t i r e l y

the panel

You're

your

have

If y o u w a n t t o , t h a t ' s

decision.
We

appreciate

excused.

MR. PORTER:

11

mrrr*

clerk.

saw the c a s e , y o u do not

c o n c l u d e your s e r v i c e .

10

12

your s e r v i c e .

any of t h o s e q u e s t i o n s .

That d o e s
it.

had

W e appreciate

4

9

I would have

about.it.

3

8

I think

r»OTTpm .

Do you want the i n s t r u c t i o n s
Vac

rJ=

-• •

f J

"'^^-^^

*- V a-n

back?

--- — V.

— V -*

Thank you.

13

What's the City's intention for the prosecution?

14 !

MR. HANSEN:

Let me--let rr\e--can I have seme time

15 ;

_c iriiiiA a^uUu it.

16

just ask the officer and--

17
18

l Con ~ jvi*«~ * J- i. i wa.nu 10 j-cur/ iu, - -. *

TKE COURT:

day for further proceedings?

19

(Inaudible)

20

THE COURT:

21
22

Do ycu want me to give it a particular

If we do, if you don't want to, we. can

just call it off.
MR. HANSEN:

What I was thinking is that maybe in

23

terms of plea negotiations at this point, ...(inaudible)

24

certainly infraction, disorderly conduct or something.

25

THE COURT:

Irll set it on my calendar for further
4

prcceedi ngs o n.e week of to day at--

1

Honor?

3

THE COURT:

4
5
6
7

Car- we make that on Thurs day, your

MR. HANSEN:

2

1

J. w X>

Yes .

MR. MUSSELMAN:
Spanish Fork at 10:00 .

9

could be here by then •

11

* " " 1 -^ ' S

S£*

A f

locks like I'm i

If we could go to 1 1:00, I think I

Just put i t en the end of the

Sure •

10:00 o f clock calenda r~

12

MR. MUSSSLMAN:

13

VT3

14

One week of yesterday

Thank you.

.MR. HANSEN:

THE COURT:

et's.
:0C.

'sday, the 24th, at

.4*U*i

8

10

JUi

HANSEN:

you,

•• f T •^

motion, no dcubt; I mean,

15

r tak ing a--

16

COURT:

17

MR. HANSEN:

18

THE COURT:

x. >.« x,

And

„;n

v~

x. VAX. u a " x .

TT Z M 1 V*

on

Honor.

aw and

proc eedin gs in terms

Yes.

P x 8a or dismis sing it.
Call ing it furthe r pr oceec ings,

19

whatever it i.3 "we're going to do.

20

scheduli ng conference for the next tria 1 or what ever else

21

we're go ing t o do.

22

MR. HANSEN:

23

THE COURT:

24

declare this trial a

25

MR. HANSEN:

We'l 1 ei ther use it for

Oka7 • Thank you / 70ur He nor.
i. 5 U

"•">,

^ i

ought to formally

/•>:

~ - - X. ^ - 2 ^

, and I do so.

Thank you, your Hone r5

TRANSCRIBER r S CERTIFICATE

1 I
2
3
4
5 I

1/ Toni Frye, do hereby certify that I am a

6

transcriber*for Penny C. Abbott, Certified Shorthand

7

Reporter, and Certified Court Transcriber cf tape recorded

8

court proceedings; that I received.the copy cf the

9

electronically recorded tape cf the within matter and under

10

her supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting,

11
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13
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14
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Addendum "B"

::i THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
OREM DEPARTMENT
-0O0-

AT.ERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 931-1064

vs.

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

' ^\ u)v/
Defendant.
-oOo-

3Z IT REMEMBERED that en the 23. d da/ of March,
1934, the abo;e-en;uled action was held before the
HONORABLE JOSEPH I. DIMICK, sitting as Jadge m

the above

named Court, and that the following proceedings were had.
-cOc-

JAMES "TUCKER" HANSSII

Harding & Associates
306 West M a m
American Fork, Utah
Fcr the Defendant:

D. JOHN MUSSELMAN
Attorney at Law
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah
84501

PHONE:
1

965-4852

84003

S

R O C E E D I N G

1
2
3

THE COURT:

4

MR. MUSSELMAN:

5

MR. HANSEN:

6

(Inaudible)

7

THE COURT:

--wherewithal

for trial?

Oh, are we go ing to trial?

I thought it was a pret rial .

I got communicati on and motions to

8

amend , mcition for an expedited hearing, motion to strike the

9

jury trial; and my response to that was

10

the t ime of trial, ca

11

^ ^ ~- o

I a!so expc

13

notice of t.v

15

4- V ^

~

ur p cse being tc

4. V* -» x

_ -

I expected to be

*• v- -

^

^ , , ^ — ,- - 4-

4- U - J-

J

-

**

*. — w *.

v..

t-i.;,^

~> j

^ & A — ii. ^

proceeding;

V ~ --

s alreadj heard the

Frankly, I'm prepared to rule •
there 1 s any ciner

VT5

17

A AAV •

I

evidence from either side, is there?

19

MR. MUSSELMAN:

20

THE COURT:

Yeah, I'm not going to present--

I suspect that Mr . Lynch would be

21

scmew hat taken aback if he didn't--wasn f t here for his own

22

trial •

23

1

•

16

18

^3 -

for trial

12

14

«^

MR. MUSSELMAN:

24

rule, zhen I'l

25

I'll call and-

1

4- _, f 1.

I'll tell you what, why don't you

:o him and if he s w-. ^r^w

2

c the ceiling,

1
2

THE COURT;

I think I would prefer to settle the

evidence and invite him in, just to avoid that.
MR. MUSSELMAN:

3

Okay.

I apologize if I

4

misunderstood.

5

that (inaudible) struck the jury trial, but he wants us to

6

be there for a pretrial anyway.

7

lnii ^uUux .

My~~I got the message from my secretary,

riex x , no, x wa^> juSu ^..x*i^.-i.-.*^ u*-.a~

8

it's harmless; jeopardy doesn't attach before.

9

simple thing to conduct arraignment or waiver on the new

TO

charges and to have the trial, was my purpose.
MR. MUSSELMAN:

11
12

It's a

-e just got the message wrong.

But I agree with-

13

TKE COURT:

Oh, I can see that.

14

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Well, that may have been

15

Bonnie's understanding, when ycu told--fca^se when I talked

16

tc Bonnie, she said, I called and tcld them that the trial

17

is off.

I asked--

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. MUSSELMAN:

20

The jury is off.

Well--

Well, on one end or the other or

both.
THE COURT:

21

I grant American Fork City's motion to

22

amend to an infraction of disorderly conduct.

23

elements of the charge?

24

behavior?

25

MR. JKANSEN:

What's the

Violent, tumultuous or threatening

Right.

Or making unreasonable noises
3

!

in a public place.

2

allegations of abusive or obscene language or obscene

3

gestures, so that would be the--

4 J

I don't believe that there were any

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Looks like intent to cause public

5

j inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, and engaged in fighting

6

i or violent, tumultuous or threatening--

7

THE COURT:
MR

8 j
g

- MUSSELMAN:

j public place.

10 I " r
....

eri

Or other violent —

3 a sed in

--or made unreasonable noises in z

It talks about private places; doesn't apply.
abusive or cbscer.e

language or made obscene

gestures.

12

|

MR. HANSEN:

(Inaudible)

13

|

THE COURT:

Go get us the bock.

,

THE COURT:

Skip the black

14
15

16
17

MR. MUSS2LMATJ:

Let's see no«, it says ordinances

of American Fork City, but the Code section seems to

18 j duplicate the-19 J

MR. HANSEN:

The City has adopted the State Code

20

and adopted an ordinance allowing us to cite specifically to

21

the State Code.

22
23
24
25

MR. MUSSELMAN:

So, 96-S-102 UCA would be

identical to--to the American Fork City ordinance.
THE COURT:

The .American Fork City ordinance

doesn't promulgate'.the--the~or republish the State, does
4

j I it?

It just a d o p t s it

2

J

MR. HANSEN:

3

I that y o u can c h a r g e by the cite

4 J

Yeah.

MR- M U S S E L M A N ;

Just adopts it and i n d i c a t e s
(inaudible).

I ? m glad they did that.

It sure

_ . makes it m o r e c o n v e n i e n t , m a k e m e r e s e n s e

o
6

I

THE COURT:

W e l l , w h a t I'd p r o p o s e to do is to set

7

a h e a r i n g that will h a v e m u l t i p l e p u r p o s e s ; the first is

8

a r r a i g n m e n t that the defendant h a s r e q u e s t e d ; the s e c o n d is
4- ~ 4 ~ 1

9

And I intend to take judicial n o t i c e of the

10
11

e v i d e n c e received at the prior t r i a l , w h i c h was tried in my

12
13
14

e v i d e n c e if y o u w i s h i t .

d u p l i c a t i v e of the p r i o r t r i a l .
Any r e a s o n w e shouldn't p r o c e e d in that

15

ilR .

16
17

THE C O U R T :

22

-

ui.4j.IlA,

^*xciu

i

w.**e

CO-TSv^

Won't take very l o n g , will it?

MR. MUSSELMAN:

19

21

r i */ w i^ £L ^i*-*** .

fashion?

procedure.

18

20

I w o u l d encourage not being

I don't think s o .

I s u p p o s e it's

p o s s i b l e that t h e r e m a y b e (inaudible) evidence over m y
objection.
THE COURT:

I think y o u would expect the City to

MR. HANSEN:

I have n o t h i n g further to p r e s e n t .

23
24
25

MR. MUSSELMAN:

No.

I say over m y objection
5

from

1

(inaudible) again.

2

THE COURT:

We oan do it fairly short.

We have an

3

11:00 o'clock time .open on Monday, the 4th of April.

4

would be a week from next Monday.

5

MR. MUSSELMAN:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. HANSEN:

8

I--let f s see, at 11:00?

Monday's one of the days you want?
Monday or Thursdays are good for m e ,

yes; the Circuit Court has (Inaudible)

9

MR. MUSSELMAN:

I think I--I ? m a little tight that

10

day; come from Spanish—Springville and going back to

11

Spanish, it's a little tight.

12

the risk of beiiig late —

13

THE COURT:

14

t „ J - ^

— ** **

17

20
21

We can do it Thursday of that week at

MR. MUSSELMAN:
I

19

I think I'd rather not run

1:00 o'clock, Thursday the 7th.

15

18

That

4-1

.4-

I'm up in Salt Lake in a jury

J — -.

THE COURT:

We car. dc it Thursday the 14th at 1:0

o'clock.
MR. MUSSELMAN:

I'm in trial in Fillmore that day

Sorry to be so impossible.
What's April 11th?

Is that a holiday?

I don't

22

have anything on my schedule that day, I was just wondering

23

if there's a good reason.

24

THE COURT:

No.

25

MR. MUSSELMAN:

There's not.
Could we do it April 11th?
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t STATE OF UTAH
S3

COUNTY CF SALT LAKE

}

I, PENNY C. ABECTT, a Certified Shorthand
5
6

Reporter, do hereby certify that I received the copy of the
electronically recorded tape (No. SC) in the matter of

7
American Fork City, plaintiff, vs. David Lynch, defendant,
8
and that I caused it to be transcribed into typewriting, and
9
una^ a iui

d

:ect transcription cf said hearing

10
so recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing
11
pages numbered from 1 to 7, inclusive, and that said pages
12
constitute an accurate and complete transcription of all the
13
proceedings adduced at the hearing and contained on the tape
14
except where it is indicated that the tape recorded court
15
16
17

proceedings were inaudible.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 27th day cf September, 13S4.
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aas/^a

22

bbott,

23
24
25

L i c e n s e #93
My commission expires:

Sept. 24, 1996

C.S.R.

Addendum "C"

Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF AMERICAN FORK CITY
VS

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

LYNCH, DAVID N
30 E 300 N
AMERICAN FORK

CASE NO: 931001064
DOB:
/ /
UT 84003
TAPE:
COUNT:
DATE: 04/26/94
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 76-9-102 DISORDERLY CONDUCT
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Bench
Fine:
50.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail:
0
Susp:
0
ACS:
0
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS;
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
0.00 Due:
37.04
Fine Description: Surcharge - 35%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
0.00 Due:
12.96
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
0.00 Due:
50.00
TRACKING;
Fine Stay
04/30/94
POCKET INFORMATION;
Chrg: DISORDLY CONDUCT
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Be
Fine Amount:
50.00
Suspended:
.00
Fines and assessments entered: FN
37.04
Total fines and assessments..:
SL
12.96
50.00
BY JTHE COURT

l&

GE, CIRCUIT C

NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT.

